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Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait 
Relations: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model 
 
 
WEIXING HU1
 
 
 
 
Relations across the Taiwan Strait have experienced several cycles over the last 60 
years.  Tension and crisis seem to come and go, followed by periods of peace and 
stability.  What explains the cyclical pattern of change and stability?   How can we 
explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship?  This article examines 
the last 60 years' cross-Strait relations in light of an interpretative framework of 
"punctuated equilibrium."  Cross-Strait relations are complex, consisted of actors at 
the domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels.  With a high degree of economic 
interaction, the cross-Strait relationship can be characterized as economic 
integration cum political impasse.  This article analyzes the cyclical changes through 
three causal factors: a) the role of issue cycles in cross-Strait relations; b) the 
impulsive drivers for change, and c) the structural constraints dampening change. 
 
 
 
 
Relations across the Taiwan Strait have shown a cyclical pattern of change and 
stability over the last 60 years.   Many view this pattern as an oscillation between 
peace and conflict or times of détente alternating with times of tension and crisis.  
The first 30 years (1949-1979), starting from the Kuomintang's (the Nationalist Party) 
defeat and retreat to Taiwan, saw a pattern of power competition and armed conflicts, 
based on ideological rivalry and political hostility.  When China under Deng 
Xiaoping started economic reforms and a new peaceful unification policy toward 
Taiwan in 1979, the two sides of the Strait toned down hostile rhetoric and resumed 
economic and social contacts.  Yet, peaceful engagement and economic relations 
cannot solve the fundamental impasses inherent in the relationship.  During the Lee 
Teng-hui period (1988-1999) and Chen Shui-bian period (2000-2008), peace and 
stability in cross-Strait relations were punctuated by periodic tension and crisis.   
With a high degree of economic interaction, the cross-Strait relationship can be 
characterized as economic integration cum political impasse.  Over the past 60 years, 
tension and crisis seem to come and go, followed by periods of peace and stability.  
Why have cross-Strait relations cycled like this over the past 60 years?   How can we 
explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship?  One explanation is 
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that the domestic foundation for stable cross-Strait relations began to erode as 
Taiwan's political system was democratized since the early 1990s.  When a more 
democratized Taiwan embarked on its search for a new national identity, competing 
nationalisms on the two sides are bound to come on a collision course.2   While the 
"identity politics" drive the two sides further apart, commerce and economic ties seem 
to bring them closer. 3    As some analysts argue, any equilibrium in cross-Strait 
relations is inherently unstable, and tension or conflict will drive relations back to a 
status quo of deadlock from which a new cycle can again start.  This is because the 
state of neither war nor peace is determined by the logic of "a continuing status quo 
of deadlock."4
This article supplements the above discussion with a new analytical perspective.   
It examines the last 60 years' cross-Strait relations in light of an interpretative 
framework of "punctuated equilibrium."  The punctuated equilibrium model, first 
developed by paleontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, argues that 
major change do not happen over a gradual course but in localized and sudden events 
of branching speciation,  as opposed to a gradual evolution of Charles Darwin.  In this 
article I analyze the dynamics of the oscillation between peace and tension and how 
periods of relative stability have transferred to periods of change and tension in cross-
Strait relations.   The punctuated equilibrium model provides the basis for delineating 
the conditions for cycles of change and stability.  There is clearly a high degree of 
stability built in the cross-Strait relations as seen in the strong maintenance force of 
the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.  The stabilizing force can be attributed to such 
factors as domestic constraints in Taiwan, economic development and peaceful 
unification strategy of Beijing, and Washington's concerns about peace and stability 
in East Asia and its leverage over Taipei and Beijing.  Yet, in the last two decades, 
cross-Strait relations have undergone some major changes resulting mainly from 
emerging actors in Taiwanese politics and actions and reactions in the cross-Strait 
interplay between Beijing and Taipei.  So without a  dynamic theory of change, we 
cannot fully understand the cyclical pattern of cross-Strait relations. 
   
Cross-Strait relations are complex, consisted of actors at the domestic, cross-Strait, 
and international levels.  The three main actors in the big triangular relationship--
Beijing, Taipei, and Washington--pursue different policy objectives and assess 
change and its implications from its own interest.  Closely connected with the big 
triangle, the interaction between the KMT, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutes a small triangle in cross-Strait 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Steve Yui-Sang Tsang and Hung-mao Tien, eds., Democratization in Taiwan: 
Implications for China (London: MacMillan Press, 1999); Chao Chien-min, "Will Economic 
Integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to a Congenial Political Culture?" Asian Survey, 
vol.43, no.2, pp.280-304; and Daniel Lynch, Rising China and Asian Democratization, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2006.  
3 Leng Tse-Kang, "State and Business in the Era of Globalization: the Case of Cross-Strait Linkages in 
the Computer Industry," The China Journal, issue 53 (2005), pp.63-79, and Scott L. Kastner, Political 
Conflict and Economic Interdependence Across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009. 
4  Steven M. Goldstein, "The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock?" Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, vol.15, no.1 (2002), pp.85-94.  Also see Jacques de Lisle, "Vicious 
Cycles and Virtuous Cycles: International Contexts, Taiwan Democracy, and Cross-Strait Relations," 
in Cross-Strait at the Turning Point: Institution, Identity and Democracy, ed., I Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan: 
Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 2008. 
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relations, and this small triangle increasingly becomes the most active driver for 
future change and stability.  Considering this two-tiered structure of cross-Strait 
relations, this article proposes to explain the cyclical changes over the last 60 years by 
looking at three causal factors: a) the role of issue cycles in cross-Strait relations; b) 
the impulsive drivers for change, and c) the structural constraints dampening change.   
Following the introduction, the second section briefly discusses how the punctuated 
equilibrium model can contribute to our understanding of the cycles of change and 
stability in cross-Strait relations.  The third section describes three cycles of change 
and stability over the past 60 years.  Then it is followed by a section on the issue 
cycles and impulsive drivers for change.  The fifth section analyzes the structural 
constraints that bring changes back to equilibrium or a dynamic status quo.    
 
Cycles of Change and Stability and Punctuated Equilibrium 
 
In a generic sense, cycles of change and stability occur when new issues arise and 
reconfiguration of power and redistribution of interest occur.  Interpreting cycles of 
change and stability in cross-Strait relations requires us to understand actors, issues, 
and conditions for change.   Actors are the most important factor in moving the cycle 
of change and stability.  In a simple system of what Herbert Simon described as 
"satisficing", most actors are "satisficers" who seek satisfactory solutions rather than 
optimal ones or accept choices  that are "good enough" for their purposes. 5
The cycles of change and stability in cross-Strait relations, however, have not 
occurred in an incremental fashion, rather in a punctuated equilibrium fashion.  
“Punctuated equilibrium” is a theory in evolutionary biology first introduced by 
paleontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould.  In their seminal paper 
published in 1972, the two paleontologists challenged the Darwinist evolution theory.  
They argue that the degree of phyletic gradualism attributed to Darwin is virtually 
nonexistent in fossil record.
  Yet some 
actors in the system are motivated to seek change as they become dissatisfied with the 
"status quo".  The challengers of the status quo have strong incentives to undercut 
existing systemic forces and undermine stability by creating new policy issues for 
public debate.  Their strong dissatisfaction not only leads them to demand for policy 
change but also structural changes.  Yet the cross-Strait relationship, like other 
enduring rivalries for power and sovereignty, has deep-seated raison d'être for 
continuity due to the cultural and ethnical ties and the civil wars history.  Its cycle of 
change and stability is a different play from those in domestic politics, as it involves 
forces and constraints at the cross-Strait relations as well as the international level.   
6
                                                 
5  Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, vol.3, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997, 
pp.291-95. 
  While the theory of gradualism argues that evolution 
occurs uniformly by smooth and continuous transformation of whole lineages, the 
punctuated equilibrium theory disputes that major evolutionary changes don't happen 
over a gradual period but in localized, rare, rapid events of branching speciation.  
Later on, the model of punctuated equilibrium was applied to the study of social 
sciences to reconstruct patterns of change and stability in social and policy 
developments.  It is useful to show how social and policy changes are punctuationally 
6  Eldredge, Niles and S. J. Gould (1972). "Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic 
gradualism" In T.J.M. Schopf, ed., Models in Paleobiology. San Francisco: Freeman Cooper. pp. 82-
115. Reprinted in N. Eldredge Time frames. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 193-223. 
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disrupted and then reformulated, rather than gradually altering over time.  As Stephen 
Jay Gould observes, “plateaus of stagnation and bursts of achievement might express 
a standard pattern for human learning”, and human learning generally proceeds 
through plateaus of breakthroughs, and that “important changes in our lives occur 
more often by rapid transition than by gradual accretion.”7
Inspired by the biological theory of punctuated equilibrium, social scientists try to 
find ways to explain complex social change and, particularly, patterns of social 
change over time.  For social scientists, while incremental change remains the most 
normal pattern of social development, large social shifts do happen and these massive 
shocks should deserve more attention.  Stephen Krasner uses the punctuated 
equilibrium concept to describe the pattern of change in political institutions.  He 
argues that political institutions are sticky and perpetuate themselves for a time, but as 
tension builds up crises are required to diffuse the increasing tension and punctuated 
changes occur.
   
8  In the study of international relations, the punctuated equilibrium 
model has been applied to the study of changes in international energy regime 
complex, 9  international environmental regimes, 10  and changes in international 
norms. 11  Paul Diehl and Charlotte Ku use the punctuated equilibrium model to 
explain why there are infrequent but influential changes in the international legal 
system.  To them, the interaction between operating and normative systems in 
international law leads changes in one system that precipitates changes and create 
capacity in the other system.12
The study of public policy and institutional evolution used to be dominated by 
traditional theories arguing that changes take place incrementally due to the vested 
interests, bounded rationality, and institutional cultures.  By introducing the 
punctuated equilibrium model to the study of policy change, Frank Baumgartner and 
Bryan Jones were among the first to describe a life cycle of public policy.  They 
argue that policy change occurs in extended periods of stasis, punctuated by sudden 
shifts in radical change.   The life of a policy process is characterized by long periods 
of stasis, punctuated by large but less frequent shifts in government and social 
environment.  So in that sense, the punctuated equilibrium model sketches a disjoint 
and abrupt process of policy change, with long periods of stability separating the 
shifts.
  
13
                                                 
7 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Cambridge, MA and London, England: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002, P.957. 
  Policy change is a complex process, and sometimes takes a nonlinear life 
cycle.   Once a policy is formulated or adopted, it takes a long period of consolidation 
during which relatively small changes occur over time and the existing institutions 
have inertia to continue the course until major change occurs.  To Baumgartner and 
8 Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the state: Alternative conceptions and historical dynamics," 
Comparative Politics, vol.16, no.2 (January 1984), pp.223-246. 
9 Jeff D. Colgan, Robert O. Keohane and Thijs Van de Graal, "Punctuated Equilibrium in the Energy 
Regime Complex," Review of International Organizations, published online 26 July 2011. 
10  Oran R. Young, International Dynamics: Emergent Patterns of International Environmental 
Governance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. 
11 Gary Goertz, International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model, Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
12 Paul F. Diehl and Charlotte Ku, The Dynamics of International Law, Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
13 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
5 
 
Jones, the policy life cycle encompasses both incremental adjustment and 
nonincremental change within the policy subsystems when the policy could no longer 
contain the demands for change.14
Similar to the biological version of the theory, the punctuated equilibrium theory 
in social sciences examines large changes in a relatively long-term perspective, 
spanning from decades to hundreds of years.  The empirical validity of the punctuated 
changes requires a large set of data that track policy stasis and change over the whole 
life cycle of a policy.  For example, True, Jones, and Baumgartner try to explain 
radical policy changes by examining the rise and fall of the American federal budgets 
over periods of more than a hundred years.
     
15 By the same token, Aaron Wildavsky 
chose to study the U.S. federal budgets over fifteen years.16
While the incremental framework emphasizes on constant small changes, the 
punctuated equilibrium model highlights major shifts in policy process.  If the former 
describes the normal pattern of policy development, the latter portrays large shifts in a 
punctuated pattern together with periods of policy stability.  The difference between 
the two models can be illustrated below by a straight linear line and a nonlinear line 
with stasis as well as wide margin of up and down.   
  But for Wildavsky, the 
purpose of his study was not to validate the punctuated equilibrium model, rather, to 
develop a cultural theory of budgeting that explains the degree of balance between 
revenue and expenditure and why government grows in all industrial democracies 
from a framework of incremental change.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, eds., Policy Dynamics, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002, pp.29-46. 
15 James L. True, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner and Jones, "Punctuated-Equilibrium 
Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking," in Theories of the Policy Process 
(2nd ed.), ed. Paul A. Sabatier, Boulder: Westview Press, 2007, pp.97-116. 
16 Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgeting Process, Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown, 1975. 
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Figure 1. Two Patterns of Change & Stability over Time  
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The punctuated equilibrium model describes alternative periods of stability and 
changes in policy and relationship.   To what extent can this model explain the change 
and stability in cross-Strait relations over the last 60 years?   There are at least three 
relevant insights.  First, concerning why and how policy change occurs in cycles, we 
can see each cycle signifies the emergence and recession of policy issues in the public 
agenda.  When a new issue appears or is introduced, public attention on the issue 
arises.  As the policy issue changes, public attention shifts.  This is exactly the 
"invisible hand" behind the cycles in cross-Strait relations. 
Second, policy issues are created by politicians and policymakers, so the role of 
political actors in agenda setting matters.  There is conflict of forces that reinforce or 
question the existing policy.  Existing policy is exacerbated by institution and balance 
of political power.  Political elites play a critical role in shaping and changing the 
public debate and hence setting the agenda for policy change.  Agenda setting shifts 
public attention and explains the prioritization of policy issues in public debate.  By 
focusing on attention shift and agenda setting, we can find that in the case of policy 
change, actors across the entire political system shift attention collectively and 
"entering new policy domains is more punctuated than withdrawing from old ones."17
Third, what causes the change is another interesting aspect the model directs our 
attention at.  Baumgartner and Jones have introduced "positive feedback" and 
"negative feedback" to analyze the equilibrium in politics.
 
18
Therefore, the punctuated equilibrium model, as it is applied to studying policy 
change, cannot fully account for policy dynamics and the mechanisms of the change-
stability cycle and what really tips the equilibrium for change in particular.  For a 
long time, election is considered as the standard model for policy change in 
democratic systems since election indicates the public's preferences and creates the 
mandate for policy change.  In today's Taiwan political environment of intensive 
partisanship and polarization, one might be tempted to conclude that only election 
matters and incremental changes are not relevant.  But the "election matters" model 
treats the sources of change as fully exogenous, and many policy changes occur in the 
absence of electoral change—such as leaders' new policy declarations, domestic and 
external crisis, and rising public awareness of certain issues.  If we use the path 
dependence theory to look at cross-Strait relations, we can find the weight of 
precedents, institutional separation of power, partisan politics, and interest groups, etc. 
  The forces for change 
include social learning, crisis, institutional changes, and the role played by political 
entrepreneurship.  They could be both structural/institutional or behavioral forces.  
The agenda-setting perspective has recognized the critical role of information and 
policy entrepreneurs in the policy process. Yet problem definition does not generally 
occur in a vacuum.  All social problems are embedded in given social environment 
and structure.  We should look for source of change from both behavioral and 
structural perspectives.  This is because impulsive forces for change are eventually 
constrained by structural attributes.   
                                                 
17 Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes 
Problems, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p.199. 
18 Baumgartner and Jones, op. cit (1993), pp.16-18. 
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has a strong reinforcement effect on the status quo.  Yet massive policy shifts do 
occur in Taiwan without election.  Leaders do use policy adjustments and public 
awareness to accumulate energy for change.  The build-up of what Gould calls 
“plateaus of stagnation” will eventually break the equilibrium at play.  
There are of course both indigenous and exogenous disturbance that trigger 
changes.  The U.S. and the mainland China are shadow players in Taiwanese politics.  
Theories of change and dynamics also tell us there are both long-run determinants 
that make cross-Strait relations ripe for change (such as economic interdependence 
and social linkages) and short-term elements such as electoral victory and leadership 
change.  The shifting fundamental economic trend across the Taiwan Strait is an 
important factor that makes the cross-Strait relationship ripe for change.   
Cycles of Stability and Change in Cross-Strait Relations, 1949-2012 
 
Before discussing the cycles of change and stability, we need to understand the 
structural complexity of cross-Strait relations.   The relationship is complex and 
dynamic.  By nature, the dynamics of the relationship must be conceived and studied 
as three "two-level games"19 within the China-U.S.-Taiwan triangular relationship.  
Within the big triangle, there are two important bilateral two-level games that 
mutually affect one another: (1) the cross-Strait interplay that is deeply rooted in 
domestic politics in Taiwan and in the mainland China; and (2) China-U.S. relations , 
a relationship between two major powers that have significant impacts on regional 
and global affairs as well as cross-Strait relations.  Concerning the cross-Strait 
relationship, there are different advocacy coalitions in Taiwan politics, consisting of 
actors from political parties and social organizations that actively campaign for 
particular policy issues.20
                                                 
19 The concept of "two-level game" was first developed by Robert Putnam.  See his article entitled 
"Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization. 
vol.42 (Summer 1988), pp.427-460. 
 Nationalistic leaders on the both sides of the Strait have to 
gain domestic support to sustain their power position.  Cross-Strait political and 
economic relations are of paramount importance for all parties concerned.  While 
Beijing and Taipei compete for influence at the cross-Strait level, two big parties in 
Taiwan, the KMT and DPP, are pitted against each other at the domestic level.  Their 
relations with the CCP could also used as a leverage in political competition.  For 
Beijing, although both economic development and political reunification are 
important missions, the latter is rather a long shot.  At the international level, the 
cross-Strait relationship is overshadowed by the competitive and cooperative relations 
between the United States and China.  For the United States, its policy toward cross-
Strait relations is based on strategic considerations of its national interest in East Asia.   
20  Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An 
Assessment”, in Theories of the Policy Process, eds. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1999), pp.117-166. 
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Within this big triangular framework, there are six variables: three domestic 
political processes (at the three corners) and three bilateral relationships (represented 
by the three sides of the triangle).   For the last 60 years, Taiwan, as the smallest 
player in the triangle, has been an “underdog” in the triangular game.21
There are different ways of delimiting periods in the last 60 years' cross-Strait 
relations.
   However, 
Taipei’s role in the triangle has changed dramatically since the early 1990s.  It has 
taken a series initiatives at home and toward the mainland, and actually turned itself 
into what Su Qi calls "a tail that could wag two dogs" over the last two decades. 
22 For this study, three cycles of change and stability are identified according 
to the pattern of rise and fall of tension and contentious issue involved.  These three 
cycles are: (a) 1949-1979; (b) 1979-1999; and (c) 1999-present.  Each cycle includes 
the rise and fall of tension over some contentious issue, followed by a period of  
détente.  To interpret the curvilinear trend, it is important to identify the dominant 
contentious issue(s) within each cycle that drove up tension and the conditions under 
which a policy issue cycle was exhausting.   A policy life cycle is defined as stages of 
issue recognition, policy debate, agenda setting, policymaking, implementation, and 
feedbacks.23
 
     
                                                 
21 The idea of this diagram is adopted from Su Chi’s concept of “a tail wags two dogs.”  See Su Chi, 
Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: a Tail Wagging Two Dogs, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 
22  See, for example, Shao Zhong-hai, Research into Cross-Strait Relations(兩岸關系） , Taipei, 
Taiwan: Wu Nan Publisher, 2006, and Allen Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Relations for 
China's Territorial Integrity, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.  
23  Paul Cairney, Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012, pp.32-34, and Christopher J. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics: The Life Cycle of a 
Public Issue, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987. 
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(1) The first cycle (1949 to 1979): rivalry over power and sovereignty.  The 
relationship across the Taiwan Strait in this period was in a state of military and 
diplomatic war first and then turned to détente.  The contentious issue was which side 
of the Strait had sovereign power to rule China and who represented China in the 
world.  Both sides tried to change the status quo by overpowering the other in 
competition.  The high points of tension were two Taiwan Strait Crises. 
Following the founding of the PRC in Beijing on October 1, 1949, the 
Kuomintang government was forced to retreat to Taiwan and the KMT-CCP power 
struggle and civil war turned to an cross-Taiwan Strait confrontation.  From 1949 to 
the early 1960s, the cross-Strait relationship was not just in a period of Cold War but 
also in hot war and armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait.   After his defeat in the 
mainland, Chiang Kai-shek still attempted to reclaim his rule of the mainland, and 
ordered a series of blockade operations of ports in the mainland, air bombing of key 
coastal cities, and a series of cross-border raids into south and western areas in the 
mainland.   For Beijing, Mao Zedong wanted to continue to liberate the whole China, 
including the island of Taiwan.  The first Taiwan Strait Crisis began when the two 
sides first fought over offshore islands in Kinmen in 1949, Dachen Islands in 1954, 
and the nearby Yijiangshan Island in 1955.  These offshore islands were considered 
as the first line of defense against the communist invasion and footholds to attack the 
mainland.  The armed conflicts over these islands were what is called the first Taiwan 
Strait Crisis and ended when Beijing ceased bombardment of Kinmen and Matsue 
islands in 1955. 
The second Taiwan Strait Crisis started when the mainland resumed artillery 
bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu islands on August 23, 1958.  There were also air 
and naval engagements between the two sides in blocking and counterblocking the 
supply line to the islands.24
On the diplomatic front, the two sides were scrambling for international 
recognition and support.  The two sides were on a tug of war for who was the legal 
government of China.   Since the both claimed to be the legitimate government of 
China, the definition of "one China" was not in question.  The United States and most 
of Western countries recognized the Nationalist government in Taiwan while the PRC 
was recognized by the socialist block and nonaligned movement countries.  During 
this period, Washington pursued a dual policy toward Taiwan.  On one hand, it 
provided security protection against the military invasion from the mainland.  On the 
  After the first crisis, the United States entered a common 
defense treaty with Taipei to prevent military invasion from the mainland.  By the 
treaty commitment, Washington ordered the U.S. navy escort of a convoy of the 
Taiwanese supply ships to the islands.  For Beijing, the PLA was ordered to refrain 
from shelling on the U.S. escort ships.  The Kinmen shelling later became a political 
game than real war when Beijing announced an "even-day cease fire" in October 
1958, which means that the mainland would only shell on odd-numbered days and let 
resupply to Kinmen and Matsu on even-numbered days.  In later years live shells 
were replaced with propaganda shells, and the bombardment was finally terminated in 
1979. 
                                                 
24 For more detail of the first and second Taiwan Strait Crisis, see, for example, Chen Jian, Mao's 
China the Cold War, University of North Carolina Press, 2000; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: 
Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.249-252;  
Lambert M. Surhonem Miriam T. Timpledon, and Susan F. Marseken, Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, 
Bestascript Publishing 2010, and  Peter Jaw, Taiwan vs China 1958, AuthorHouse, 2009.  
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other hand, it also restrained Taipei from military adventures to retake the mainland 
because it might drag the U.S. into a war it didn't want.  It was not until 1971 that the 
UN General Assembly passed Resolution No.2758 on October 25, 197 that 
recognizes the PRC as "the only legitimate representative of China to the United 
Nations" and expelled the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which 
they unlawfully occupy at the UN.  Beijing's return to the UN was a big victory for 
the PRC, and it was followed by President Nixon's decision of the diplomatic opening 
to China and his historic visit to China in February 1972.  In the Shanghai 
Communiqué issued after Nixon's visit, China and the U.S. agreed to set aside the 
"crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations" concerning the political 
status of Taiwan and to open up trade and other contacts between the two countries.  
Six years later, Washington decided to switch its formal diplomatic relationship from 
Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979.  On the same day, the Chinese National 
People's Congress issued a "Message to Compatriots on Taiwan", in which Beijing 
announced to stop the bombardment of Jinmen and Matsu and to pursue peaceful 
ways to solve the Taiwan question.25
(2) The second cycle (1979-1999): from détente to tension.  This period started 
with a period of détente and dialogue, but two impetuous events turned the 
relationship into growing tension and then the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.  Two events 
were Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University in June 1995 and his "state-to-state 
relations" statement in July 1999.  The emerging contentious issue was whether the 
two sides of the Strait still coexist in the "One China" framework or their relations are 
what Lee called "special state-to-state relationship". 
  
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait entered a period of détente after Beijing's new 
peaceful unification policy in 1979.  Although Chiang Ching-kuo rejected Beijing’s 
initial peace offer by reiterating Chiang Kai-shek's "three nos policy,"26
The phasing out of the Chiang family’s influence in Taiwan, however, led to the 
“Taiwanization” of the island’s politics, which planted seeds for future confrontation. 
To consolidate his power within the Kuomintang (KMT) and the government, Lee 
Teng-hui embarked on a series of political reforms aimed at transferring political 
power from the Mainlanders (Waisheng Ren) to the native-born Taiwanese 
(Bensheng Ren).  As a Beisheng Ren, Lee has no interest in “retaking the mainland” 
 he allowed 
Taiwanese to visit their relatives in the mainland in November 1987.  After Chiang 
Ching-guo died in January 1988, the end of Chiang family’s rule of Taiwan marked a 
new era for cross-Strait relations.   Lee Teng-hui, a native-born Taiwanese who 
succeeded Chiang, took initial steps toward cross-Strait reconciliation by allowing 
more family reunions, personnel exchanges, and even substantive dialogues with the 
mainland.  Beijing reciprocated by welcoming Taiwanese "compatriots" for tourism, 
investment, and family reunification.  The two sides, through government-authorized 
agencies—the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) on the 
mainland side and the Straits Exchanges Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwan side, 
reached an oral agreement on the meaning of the "One China principle" in Hong 
Kong in 1992, and held the first historic direct negotiation in Singapore in 1993. 
                                                 
25 The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress, "Message to Compatriots in 
Taiwan", full text in http://www.china.org.cn/english/7943.htm.  
26 The “three nos policy” was that "no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation" were allowed with 
the communist government in the mainland. It was laid down by Chiang Kai-shek after his retreat to 
Taiwan.  
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or talking reunification with the mainland.  To sever symbolic links with the mainland, 
Lee initiated and pushed for a series of “localization” measures.  He eliminated the 
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion in 1991 
(which outlawed opposition activities after the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949), 
forced those legislators originally elected to represent mainland constituencies to 
retire, and dissolved the National Assembly elected in 1946 on the mainland, and 
later held the first-ever direct presidential election in 1996.  Lee’s reforms not only 
helped to consolidate his political power, but also paved the way for the rising power 
of the DPP, a pro-independence party in Taiwan.27
Lee Teng-hui’s first head-on confrontation with Beijing came in June 1995 when 
he paid a high-profile visit to his alma mata Cornell University.  Lee’s visit triggered 
a severe cross-Strait crisis as well as strained China-U.S. relations during Bill 
Clinton’s first presidential term since the Clinton Administration granted him a visa 
to pay this visit.  Domestically, Lee’s “stand-up to Beijing” drove up his popularity.  
Across the Strait, Beijing was caught in surprise by the announcement of Lee's visit 
but had little leverage at disposal to stop that.  To contain Lee and intimidate 
Taiwanese voters in the 1996 presidential election, Beijing carried out large-scale 
military exercises across the Strait and launched missiles close to Taiwan. These 
actions had the opposite result of further alienating the Taiwan populace.
 
28
Two years later, SEF Chairman Mr. Koo Chen-fu visited the mainland in October 
1998 as the tension began to calm down.  Mr. Koo met Mr. Jiang Zhemin (Secretary 
General of the CCP) and his counterpart Mr. Wang Daohan.  As the SEF and ARATS 
were preparing for Wang Daohan's return visit to Taiwan in 1999, Lee Teng-hui 
surprised everyone again.  In July 1999, he abandoned the KMT’s traditional “one 
China” policy and characterized cross-Strait ties as a “state-to-state” relationship.   
This statement, again, turned the relationship into tension just months before Mr 
Wang Daohan's scheduled visit to Taiwan to restore the cross-Strait dialogue.  For 
Beijing, Lee's statement was seen as just a step short of calling for Taiwan 
independence as the DPP would do.
 
29
(3) The third cycle (2000 to 2012): “a tail wagging two dogs”?   This cycle 
spans from two Chen Shui-bian administrations (2000-04, 2004-08) to the 2008 and 
2012 elections, both of which returned the KMT to power.  The period of twelve 
years saw the rise and fall of the Taiwan national identity issue and the demise of 
Chen's drive for Taiwan's de jure independence.  In the 2000 presidential election, 
Chen Shui-bian’s victory was the first time in fifty years that a pro-independence 
party came to power in Taiwan.
  
30
                                                 
27 DPP's platform was revised in 1999 that any change of the island's status must be decided through a 
referendum by all its residents passed.  See DPP's “Resolution on Taiwan’s Political Future” (臺灣前
途決議文) on May 8, 1999. 
  During Chen’s first term, cross-Strait relations 
were relatively calm in the first years as Beijing took a wait-and-see policy toward the 
Chen administration.  Yet Chen started to be provocative in August 2002 when he 
28 Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis. 
London: Routledge, 1999. 
29 Bruce Dickson and Chien-min Chao, eds., Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics: 
Democratic Consolidation and External Relations, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. 
30 Shelly Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001. 
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announced that "one country on each side of the Strait" and "the referendum is 
urgent."31
Chen’s referendum drive mounted a grave challenge to both Beijing and 
Washington. The Chinese leaders were alarmed.  Their perceptions of Taiwan's 
domestic politics greatly influenced their attitudes regarding the Taiwan issue.
  Later on, he kept pushing the envelope by adopting policies interpreted in 
Beijing as moving Taiwan closer to formal independence, such as changing names of 
state entities, referendum, and pushing for a new constitution.  Chen's policy 
challenged the bottom line of both Beijing and Washington's policies toward cross-
Strait relations.  In the 2004 presidential race, he was trailing behind his “pan-blue” 
rivals in all the polls due in part to an economic slowdown, and he relied on national 
identity and Taiwan independence as issues to appeal to voters.  He even proposed a 
national referendum on a new Taiwan constitution (Quanmin Gongtou, Cuisheng 
Xinxian) in an effort to portray his KMT opponents as selling out the Taiwanese 
people and being easily cowed by Beijing. 
32  
Since the late 1990s, they had tried different strategies to contain Taiwan’s pro-
independence tendency, but none worked.  They realized that they had only limited 
leverage to curb this tendency.  The 1996 missile tests proved counterproductive. 
Stern warnings from Premier Zhu Rongji in 2000 and from Premier Wen Jiabao in 
2004 did not work either.  Learning from past experiences, the leadership under Hu 
Jintao initiated a new strategy which stressed making “the stick harder and the carrot 
sweeter.”  A domestic law (the Anti-Secession Law, or ASL, passed by the National 
People’s Congress in March 2005), inspired by the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 
would draw a clear “red line” to deter Taiwan’s formal independence.  Concomitantly, 
commercial benefits to be gained from closer cross-Strait economic integration would 
offer positive incentives.   Meanwhile, Washington also saw the risk of war that could 
endanger American interests in the Asia Pacific.33  Chen’s provocation threatened to 
destabilize U.S. relationship with China.  The Bush Administration made it clear that 
it “oppose(s) any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo in the 
Taiwan Straits,” and “would be opposed to any referenda that would change Taiwan's 
status or move towards independence.”34
The turning point in cross-Strait relations came in the second term of the Chen 
administration and the two years leading up to the 2008 election.  Due to a series of 
personal scandals, Chen was politically discredited at home and abroad.  His rival 
KMT was running on a platform of rapprochement and downplaying the national 
identity issue in the 2008 presidential race.  The KMT candidate Mr. Ma Ying-jeou 
proposed a "three nos policy"--no unification, no independence, no use of force.  
Cross-Strait rapprochement depends on accommodating mutual interests and 
institutionalizing a modus vivendi in bilateral relations.  With increasingly strong 
cross-Strait economic ties, a high degree of economic integration has become the 
  The U.S. government has rarely made such 
strong comments on Taiwan’s affairs.  It was a clear indication that Washington had 
become very displeased with Chen’s policy.  
                                                 
31 Chen Shui-bian's telecast speech to the annual conference of the World Federation of Taiwanese 
Associations in Tokyo, August 3, 2002. 
32 For more discussion on the changing attitudes, see Chien-Kai Chen, "Comparing Jiang Zemin's 
Impatience with Hu Jintao's Patience regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989-2012" Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol.21, no.78 (November 2012), pp.xx-xx. 
33 Michael D. Swaine, “The Trouble in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs Vol.83, no.2 (2004), pp.39-49. 
34 Remarks by Richard Boucher at the State Department daily press briefing, December 1, 2003.  
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anchoring force for political détente.  Over the last two decades, Beijing has pursued 
a pragmatic Taiwan policy, suggesting that “political differences should not affect 
economic cooperation.”  Even during the DPP years, it did not shut the economic 
door but had instead increased attractive terms to Taiwanese businesses.  
After he was elected in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou reversed his predecessor’s policy and 
returned to the original KMT policy of cross-Strait relations based on the “one China 
constitution.”  According to Ma, cross-strait relations are not state-to-state relations, 
but a special kind of relationship between two regions within a country. 35
The current round of cross-Strait rapprochement received its jump-start from the 
historic meeting between the leaders of CCP and KMT in May 2005.  CCP General 
Secretary Hu Jintao and KMT Chairman Lien Chan met in Beijing and issued a “Five 
Points Common Vision” statement.  Because this statement was just a party-to-party 
agreement, it was not until Ma Ying-jeou's won the 2008 election that it was brought 
into practice.  The rapprochement since then has developed along two lines.  First, the 
two sides have undertaken political dialogue over resolving their political impasse on 
the basis of the expedient “1992 consensus” (which agreed to the “one China” 
principle but left the definition of “China” ambiguous).  Second, they have embarked 
on comprehensive exchanges and engagement relations, through increasingly 
institutionalized cross-Strait dialogue arrangements.   To further consolidate détente, 
Beijing has formulated a long-term strategy of "peaceful development.”
 As a 
consequence, both sides now conduct dialogues under a framework of “mutual non-
denial”.  They view economic integration and social exchanges as part of the general 
trend of globalization and regional integration in the Asia Pacific.  Through the 
ARATS-SEF dialogues, the two sides of the Strait have signed sixteen agreements 
since 2008 on issues ranging from direct flights, shipping, food safety, combating 
crime, tourism, and investment.  More and more of their government officials have 
participated in direct negotiations, thus turning ARATS-SEF dialogues increasingly 
into government-to-government talks.  On June 30, 2010, ECFA (Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement) was signed to map out future cross-Strait 
economic relations.  Likewise, Taiwan's long-standing efforts for a presence in 
international organizations bore fruit when the World Health Organization (WHO) 
officially invited Taiwan to participate in the World Health Assembly as an observer 
in May 2009.  
36
Washington has welcomed the new rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait. In 
the Joint Statement issued after President Hu Jintao’s visit to the U.S on January 19, 
2011, it applauded the ECFA and the new lines of communications developing 
between Beijing and Taipei.  More importantly, the U.S. “supports the peaceful 
development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by 
  Hu Jintao 
elaborated this strategy in December 2008 by calling for a comprehensive economic 
cooperation agreement, more political dialogue to enhance mutual trust and even 
confidence-building measures (CBM), and finding ways to accommodate Taiwan’s 
aspiration for “international space,” in addition to further strengthening economic and 
cultural ties between the two sides. 
                                                 
35 "'Non-state-to-state' discourse based on Constitution: spokesman", Central News Agency, September 
11, 2008, http://times.hinet.net/times/article.do?newsid=1727002&option=english. 
36 The “peaceful development” strategy was initially formulated in the CCP’s 17th National Party 
Congress in October 2007. 
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both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other 
fields, and to develop more positive and stable cross-Strait relations.”37
The waning of the national identity issue can also be seen in the result of the 2012 
election in Taiwan.  For the first time in Taiwan elections, the national identity and 
the reunification/independence issue was not on the agenda.  Ma Ying-jeou's DPP 
challenger did not use the national identity issue to mobilize support, nor any tactical 
moves such as provocative referendum were used.   Instead, the national identity 
issue was largely overtaken by more substantive debates over socio-economic 
policies, ECFA and leaders' integrity and capability.   The “1992 Consensus” was one 
key issue on the agenda, but the debate was less on its political implication, more on 
its economic implication. 
  Cross-Strait 
economic integration has reduced the danger of war and the likelihood that U.S.-
China relations may be seriously damaged over the Taiwan issue. 
 
Explaining Dynamics in Cycles of Change and Stability 
 
By the above discussion, the dynamics driving the cyclical changes can be seen 
from the rise and fall of contentious issues and agenda-setting politics on these issues.  
As Baumgartner and Jones have argued, dynamics for change lies in a continual 
struggle between the forces of balance and equilibrium (termed as “negative feedback 
processes”) and the forces of destabilization and contagion (termed as “positive 
feedback processes”).38  A disturbance is usually met with countervailing forces in a 
change process.   In contrast to the stabilizing effect of negative feedback processes, 
positive feedbacks destabilize.  The positive feedback process is a self-reinforcing 
process that accentuates rather than counterbalances a trend. 39
In Taiwan politics, the KMT represents the "negative feedback" force while the 
DPP the "positive feedback" force.  The disturbance force is usually triggered by 
raising controversial issues and the agenda setting politics that follows.   There are, of 
course, all kinds of issues--social, cultural, economic, political--in cross-Strait 
relations.  However, one issue stands out from the rest as the most controversial one 
for cross-Strait relations, and this issue is the controversy on Taiwan's national 
identity.
  As such, the 
punctuated equilibrium model provides a good perspectives, together with other 
dynamical theories, to detail a specific mechanism (or set of related mechanisms) 
responsible for policy change. 
40
Dissatisfied challengers are the impulsive forces within the system that sets off a 
cycle of change, vicious or virtuous.  In the triangular relationship since the 1980s, 
both Beijing and Washington are more conservative and pro-status quo.  Although 
  Change is path-dependent and incremental.  But when major dissatisfied 
actors want to challenge the status quo, change can be impetuous accompanied by 
tension and crisis within the system.   
                                                 
37 White House, U.S.-China Joint Statement, January 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement 
38. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, “Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics,” in Policy 
Dynamics, eds., Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993, pp.3-28. 
39 Ibid, p.13. 
40 Lowell Dittmer, "Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity," Asian Survey, vol.44, no.4 (July-
August 2004), pp.475-483.  
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Beijing sees reunification as its sacred national mission, but CCP leaders, by and 
large, have remained patient in pushing forward the course.   Reunification is a long-
term shot, and before it is feasible, Beijing considers a high degree of economic 
integration with Taiwan is more desirable.  Washington's main concern in the Taiwan 
Strait is peace and stability.   As long as cross-Strait relations remain peaceful and 
stable, Washington does not have strong incentive to change the status quo.   Thus 
political actors within Taiwan have been the most active impulsive forces initiating 
the cycle of change in the last two decades.  
Since the democratization of Taiwan's political system, the KMT has no longer 
played the dominant role in Taiwanese politics and partisan politics for political 
power has become more intense.  In Taiwanese politics, since most pan-Blue 
supporters tend to be more pro-unification or pro-cross-Strait rapprochement while 
pan-Green supporters lean toward Taiwan independence, the national identity issue 
(to some extent, the so-called ethnical issue) has become a bifurcated issue dividing 
the society and defining Taiwan's political map.  The two political forces, the pan-
blue camp and the pan-green camp, are roughly divided, with the former enjoying a 
little bit larger voters base over the latter.  In Taiwan politics, cross-political camp 
voting is relatively rare.  The implication is that the both parties have to reach out so 
as to capture more votes, including those voters swinging between the two camps.   
Appealing to voters' nationalistic sentiment is an effective way to influence public 
opinions.  To get an upper hand in political competition, the DPP has used the most 
controversial issue --national identity--to appeal to a wider audience over its rival the 
KMT.  Since the national identity issue could sometimes become such a dominant 
and a highly emotional issue to appeal voters, the DPP under Chen Shui-bian (2000-
2008) tried to play the issue into its own advantage.  By playing that issue, the DPP 
was on offense and kept its rival the KMT on defense in electoral campaign.     
The DPP has played the role of a "revisionist" in the triangular game.  The party's 
platform states its ultimate goal is to establish an independent Taiwan which is 
separated from China.  On cross-Strait economic relations, the DPP regards too much 
economic dependence on the mainland hurts Taiwan and its independence course, so 
it is opposed to having close economic ties with the mainland China.  For the KMT, it 
stands somewhere between Beijing and the DPP on political issues and closer to 
Beijing on economic issues.  In the two-level game, the KMT is pitted against the 
DPP for popular support in Taiwan politics.41
Taiwan has embarked on a search for a new Taiwanese identity since the Lee 
Teng-hui years.  The Taiwanese public have gone through a process of redefining 
Taiwan's relationship with the mainland China culturally, economically and 
  In setting public agenda, the KMT was 
in a relatively disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the DPP in the 2000 and 2004 
elections, as it is a pro-status quo party and only attracts votes from pro-unification 
and pro-status quo supporters.  The KMT is status quo party because the status quo 
was in effect defined by the KMT, not the DPP, after the KMT retreated to Taiwan.   
The political system and institutions were all brought from the mainland to Taiwan by 
the KMT back in the 1940s, none of which were the DPP's creations.   Yet, after 
rounds of democratization and localization since the late 1980s, the government’s 
effort to define Taiwan as part of China began to lose its credibility. 
                                                 
41 Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwanese Elections and Cross-Strait Relations: Mainland Policy in Flux," Asian 
Survey, vol. 39, no.4 (July-August 1999), pp. 565-87. 
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politically.  Over the last two decades, there has been an significant transition from a 
highly contested national identity to a relatively consensual national identity.42  As 
the opinion survey below shows, 54.2% of respondents say they are "Taiwanese" in 
June 2011, as opposed only 17.6% did in 1992.  Even though the popular support for 
the DPP has declined since the revelation of Chen Shui-bian's scandals, the support 
for a new Taiwanese national identity has actually gone up.43
  
  Given the distribution 
of voters on the national identity issue, it is indeed very difficult for the KMT to have 
any advantage over the DPP in elections overloaded with heated debates over national 
identity issues.  On the contrary, the national identity issue gave the DPP big 
advantage in the 2000 and 2004 election, and the party tried to dominate the debate 
discourse and policy agenda by playing the identity issue.  Yet, the DPP under Chen 
Shui-bian became too "addicted" to playing the national identity issue in elections, 
and its overplay of the issue saw a "marginal rate of returns" in the 2008 and 2012 
elections.  
 
 
When the national identity issue was used by the DPP as part of its struggle with 
the KMT, identity politics became a political tool manipulating for electoral 
advantage.  Yet the Chen Shui-bian administration could not manage to address a 
multitude of problems facing Taiwan in cross-Strait relations when the DPP was in 
power from 2000 to 2008.   Given the globalization trend and fast growing cross-
Strait economic ties, Taipei has to prioritize competing interests among economic 
growth, national security, and national identity building.  Up until 2000 and after 
                                                 
42 Chien-min Chao, ‘National Security vs. Economic Interests: Reassessing Taiwan’s Mainland Policy 
under Chen Chui-bian,’ Journal of Contemporary China 13 (41) (2004), pp. 687-704. 
43 Dongtao Qi, "Divergent Popular Support for the DPP and the Taiwan Independence Movement, 
2000-2011," Journal of Contemporary China, vol.21, no.78 (November 2012), pp.xx-xx. 
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2008, the KMT controlled both executive and legislative branches of government in 
Taiwan.  Beijing started to deal with the KMT bypassing the DPP government.  The 
result of the CCP-KMT direct talks let the Taiwanese public to see an alternative to 
the cross-Strait stalemate under the DPP rule.  This has seriously undermined the 
DPP's national identity card.  The 2008 election saw an overwhelming victory by the 
KMT.  The message from the election was "economy first, politics later."  The 2012 
election reconfirmed the popular support for the KMT's rapprochement policy with a 
strong message of “don’t rock the boat.” 
 
Structural Constraints that Dampen Punctuated Changes 
 
The cycles of cross-Strait relations show a strikingly similar pattern of a 
pendulum swinging back and forth.  Each time an impulsive change is met by 
countervailing forces that push it back to the original status quo.  How can we explain 
such countervailing forces or what Baumgartner and Jones call "negative feedback" 
processes?  Are there any structural constraints that dampen punctuated impulses? 
Steven Goldstein argues that dynamic and cyclical nature of cross-Strait relations is 
determined by countervailing imperatives built in the status quo.  Since all players 
have ambiguous policies toward each other and their policies contain, within them, 
seeds for reversal and make any equilibrium inherently unstable.  Each equilibrium 
already contains seeds for change, and tension and crisis lead to a return to status 
quo. 44
Robert Putnam’s perspective of two-level games, albeit with additional emphases 
on the role of major third parties and the effects of “echo chamber,” offers a good 
angle to look at the structural mechanism that dampen punctuated changes in cross-
Strait relations.
  If stability means the return to status quo and the status quo is a highly 
dynamic phenomenon, what explains structural mechanisms for the "negative 
feedback" processes? 
45
In cross-Strait relations, internal and external conditions for change are the 
consequences of political leaders’ actions in Taipei or Beijing.  Whether their policies 
are successful depends on how they resonate with the political and economic 
   In its essence, the perspective of two-level games argues that the 
effectiveness of foreign pressure will be limited by incumbent politicians’ domestic 
“win set,” and the domestic situation facing these politicians will in turn influence 
their choice of foreign policies and the effectiveness of these policies.   Deals, formal 
or informal, struck with one’s foreign counterparts would have to be “ratified” 
domestically.  Deals could mean implicit or explicit agreements that have the intent of 
accommodating mutual interests and institutionalizing a modus vivendi to stabilize 
bilateral relations.  Such arrangements with an external counterpart are more 
vulnerable to reversal when there is sharp domestic dissension and strong foreign 
opposition.  So when politicians are hemmed in by such constraints, they are less 
motivated and able to launch bold initiatives in the first place, or they have to pay a 
heavy price for such initiatives when encountering a strong domestic “headwind.” 
                                                 
44 Steven M. Goldstein, "The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock?" Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, vol.15, no.1 (2002), pp.85-94. 
45  Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", 
International Organization vol.42, no.3 (1988), pp. 427-60. 
  
18 
 
motivations prevailing in Taiwan and the mainland.  The more they are aligned with 
the existing distribution of influence and interests, the more receptivity they will 
encounter.  Conversely, the more they are misaligned, the more difficulty, even 
adversity, they will provoke.  Beijing’s appeal as an economic partner turned out to 
be more compelling to the Taiwanese populace including DPP constituents even 
though they might have been more inclined politically to support a pro-independence 
agenda.  But Chen Shui-bian's radical policy of challenging political baseline of 
Beijing turned out to be more unsettling for the cross-Strait détente process.  Even 
without his personal corruption scandals  that eroded his political legacy, the KMT 
could have easily overturned his cross-Strait policy.  That is also why Beijing did not 
repeat its efforts at military coercion in 1996 and used a soft containment strategy 
against Taiwan's independence instead. 
Powerful economic interests constitute an important constraint on Taiwan’s pro-
independence politicians from “rocking the boat.”  In the last twenty years we see an 
interesting example of domestic and international developments “meshing” in 
promoting cross-Strait détente.   This example also illustrates Putnam’s point about 
“the importance of targeting international threats, offers, and side-payments with an 
eye towards their domestic incidence at home or abroad.” 46
The rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait was initiated and sustained by 
economic interests, but this is not to imply that politics did not matter, or that 
Beijing’s agenda for encouraging commerce with Taiwan did not have a strong 
political motivation.  But at least from Taiwan’s side, internationally-oriented 
business firms have become a powerful domestic constituency that advocates and 
lobbies for increasing cross-Strait commerce.  With the passage of time, more people 
on Taiwan became a stakeholder in expanding economic ties with China, thus making 
a reversal of policy more difficult given the changing balance of interests and 
influence in favor of keeping and even increasing these economic ties.  This is in 
stark contrast with the rapprochement on the Korean peninsula, which had stronger 
political than economic motivation because North Korea promises few immediate 
economic returns for South Korea.  Economic motivations have therefore presented a 
less compelling force for Korean rapprochement.   So the situation of "economic 
integration cum political impasse" implies that a pro-independence agenda would 
have to overcome powerful economic interests that have acquired a strong stake in 
continuing and expanding commerce across the Taiwan Strait.   
  That is, Beijing’s 
commercial enticements were important not so much because of its average effect on 
Taiwan’s population but rather because of its marginal effect on a pivotal group of 
power brokers, namely, the internationally-oriented business interests in Taipei. 
As the mainland and Taiwan become more interdependent economically, Beijing 
has gained more confident that this interdependence will improve its advantage over 
Taiwan in the long run.  Growing economic ties reassure Taiwan’s continued 
cooperation and eventual peaceful reunification. 47
                                                 
46 Putnam, ibid, p.460. 
  Beijing learned that coercive 
diplomacy can be counterproductive and play into the hands of the pro-independence 
forces in Taiwan.  It has become more restrained and careful in reacting to the 
47 Steve Chan, "Commerce between Rivals: Realism, Liberalism, and Credible Communication across 
the Taiwan Strait," International Relations of the Asia Pacific, vol.9, no.3 (2009), pp.435-467. 
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“election languages” of political parties in Taiwan.  The Chinese leaders realize that 
the hardball tactics and harsh rhetoric of the past had driven Taiwan further away 
from the mainland.  To remedy this, they have embarked upon a “hearts and minds” 
strategy aiming to win over Taiwan's populace.  They have opened the mainland 
market to agricultural products from southern Taiwan (a traditionally pro-Green area); 
mainland universities offer preferential treatment to Taiwanese students; academic 
scholars from both sides regularly hold joint conferences; Taiwanese businesses 
receive low-cost loans for investing on the mainland; daily direct cross-Strait flights 
help revitalize Taiwan’s ailing airline industry and airports; and the influx of 
mainland tourists provide tangible gains to Taiwan's economy.  For Taiwan, growing 
economic ties have helped Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT to refocus the political debate on 
economic issues, not on identity issues.  Ma’s economic appeal helped him to prevail 
in the 2008 and 2012 presidential election.  As Taiwan’s economy faces rising 
unemployment and sluggish growth after eight years of the DPP rule and the 
compound effect of the global financial crisis, the economic opportunity presented by 
China has been highly attractive. Taiwan’s businesses have invested heavily in China, 
and they have become strong stakeholders in cross-Strait stability.  As East Asian 
countries are busy forging free trade agreements with one another, Taiwan is 
concerned about becoming marginalized in this movement toward regional economic 
integration. 
The structural constraint also comes from Washington.  Instead of abetting Chen 
Shui-bian, Washington had sought to restrain him.  Even President George W. Bush, 
who at the start of his administration stated publicly that he would “do whatever” to 
assist Taiwan, found himself rebuking Chen’s referendum on United Nations 
membership.  After several serious downturns in its relations with Beijing, such as 
over the issuance of a visa for Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University, the U.S. 
sought to discourage pro-independence forces on Taiwan.  Pro-independence 
politicians found less domestic support in part because their preferred policy appeared 
to have little chance of success without U.S. support.  The reverberations hamstrung 
officials on both sides and constrained their political elbow room or domestic “win 
sets.”  Significantly, Beijing exercised self-restraint even in the face of Chen’s 
repeated provocations, and this restraint was also greatly assisted by Washington’s 
intervention to discourage Chen from taking even more provocative policies due to 
U.S. concerns about military escalation.  This non-occurrence was in turn important 
because it did not produce a political backlash in Taipei that could have mobilized 
popular support against rapprochement.  This is important because of the dynamics of 
tit-for-tat such that hardliners could feed off reciprocal bellicosity, in effect turning 
them into each other’s most effective allies in ratcheting up tension and in sustaining 
this tension. 
Washington’s policies have had the effect of restraining Chen Shui-bian, making 
it less necessary for Beijing to pursue hard-line policies.  This policy shift created a 
tacit alignment with Beijing and some scholars even label it as “co-management.”48
                                                 
48  Zhao Quansheng, “Moving toward a Co-Management Approach: China’s Policy toward North 
Korea and Taiwan,” Asian Perspective vol.30, no.1 (2006), pp.39-78. 
 It 
signified a turn-about on Washington’s part.  Before September 11, 2001, the George 
W. Bush administration adopted a pro-Taiwan stance.  After September 11, it sought 
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improved relations with Beijing, and its “rebalancing” helped to stabilize cross-Strait 
relations.  For Washington, a stable and healthy cross-Strait relationship is in the 
interest of both Washington and Beijing, with both of them interested in curbing the 
DPP’s drive toward de jure independence.  With Washington’s help to contain 
Taiwan independence, Beijing was able to adopt a more “liberal” approach toward 
Taipei, which serves Washington’s interest in the region as well.  Thus, the 
realignment of interests between Beijing and Washington set the table for future 
cross-Strait rapprochement on the basis of a common minimum denominator of “no 
independence; no use of force; and no change in status quo.” 
By this logic, relations across the Taiwan Strait are embedded in and even 
derivative of the U.S.-China relations.  It is increasingly the case as China arises 
rapidly to the big power status.  While the U.S. and China are exploring for a new 
type of strategic relatons, Taipei's cross-Strait policy is motivated by a different 
agenda.  Yet when Chen Shui-bian’s policy pushed for de jure separation from China 
or played the national identity issue to his advantage in political competition, it would 
collide with the two big powers' policy agenda.   It ran contrary to the thrust of U.S. 
policies which have generally tried to engage and accommodate China and maintain 
peace and stability in the West Pacific region.  Thus, the détente process across the 
Taiwan Strait managed to survive notwithstanding a pro-independence president in 
Taipei.   When Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shuibian tried in their respective ways to be 
agenda setters in addressing relations with China, they turned in the end to be agenda 
takers in reacting to situations dictated by Washington’s strategic calculus. 
Punctuated changes are usually initiated by impulsive forces.  Lee Teng-hui and 
Chen Shui-bian are both revisionist leaders in the triangular game.  As political 
mavericks, they overcame long odds to capture the presidency.  Their status as 
political outsiders and indeed literally political prisoners would naturally explain their 
disposition to challenge policy orthodoxies and to propose “new thinking.”  It is 
therefore unsurprising that they undertook initiatives that tried to break away from the 
past.  Their political base tended to be limited and fragile.   Chen’s presidential 
election was fortuitous on both occasions.  His two opponents had split the traditional 
KMT vote in 2000, giving him a plurality of 38% of the popular vote in that election.  
His margin of victory in 2004 was even smaller, a victory that was in part due to an 
election-eve assassination attempt on him.  Chen's initiatives to promote Taiwan 
independence were more vulnerable to reversal due to narrow electoral mandate and 
lack of an institutional power base.  Heterogeneous domestic interests made his 
initiatives possible in the first place but also caused the subsequent policy reversal.  In 
the parlance of two-level games, the domestic and international coalition of forces 
were too fragile to sustain Chen's pro-independence drive.  The DPP has tried to 
capitalize local political support and exploit the geographic cleavage that has divided 
Taiwan, with the northern part of the island dominated by the pan-Blue forces and the 
southern part dominated by the pan-Green forces.   Yet, economic intercourse and the 
forces of globalization have strengthened the larger and more internationally-oriented 
companies that are overwhelmingly located in the north.   By comparison, small and 
less competitive firms in the south have been hurt by international, including Chinese, 
competition.  In other words, the globalization process and economic relations with 
the mainland China have had this additional effect in redistributing regional influence 
and sustaining the rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait.   
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Conclusions 
 
This article has analyzed the cyclical pattern of cross-Strait relations through three 
causal factors--the role of issue cycles, impulsive drivers for change, and the 
structural constraints that dampen change.  It demonstrates that, given the current tacit 
agreement on the status quo, there are strong countervailing forces against major 
changes, especially those impulsive forces that try to play change into their 
advantages.   The structural constraints are powerful and are becoming stronger as the 
underlying economic trends across the Strait, China-U.S. relations, and the "domestic 
headwind" in China and Taiwan make it more difficult for anyone who wants to "rock 
the boat." 
A case can be made for cautious optimism about the future of cross-Taiwan Strait 
relations.  The cross-Strait rapprochement since 2008 has brought peace and stability 
to the Taiwan Strait after years of tension and confrontation.  Substantive dialogues 
were resumed in June 2008 and even institutionalized with direct participation by 
government officials in cross-Strait dialogues.  The two sides have made progress in 
dialogues and expanding cross-Strait exchanges by focusing on an agenda of "economy 
first, politics second; easy issues first, difficult ones later".   However, the current 
rapprochement based on the "constructive ambiguity" of the "1992 Consensus" may 
not an enduring one.  Following an incremental approach and “shelving disputes and 
building mutual trust,” the two sides of the Strait have harvested all low-hanging 
fruits and left the hardcore political impasse untouched.  The political impasse in 
cross-Strait relations—the sovereignty issue concerning future cross-Strait political 
relations--remains a hindrance for future developments, and there seems no way to 
get around of it.  Before it is too long, the current equilibrium may be punctuated by 
another impulsive change if rising nationalistic sentiment on the two sides leads to 
another confrontation over the "reunification or independence" issue.  
 
